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Small Firms and Superfund: Assessing the Impact
Jeffrey E. Sohl and William E. Wetzel, Jr.
While all firms experience varying degrees of difficulty in complying with envi­
ronmental regulations, small firms have their own set of special problems in 
dealing with environmental compliance. The lack of legal and engineering staffs, 
the management structure, and a high cost per unit of production to comply with 
environmental regulations implies a diversion o f a small firm’s limited resources 
to formulating a cost effective response to the rapidly changing landscape of 
environmental regulations. The cornerstone of the shifting focus towards hazardous 
waste regulation, in terms of both actual and potential impacts, is the Compre­
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, commonly 
referred to as Superfund. Given the unique liability features o f Superfund, the 
olgective of this research is to assess the impact o f Superfund liability on the ability 
of small firms to raise capital, invest in plant and equipment, and to continue 
their role as the principal job generating segment of the U.S. economy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Environmental regulations affect all firms, both large and small, and in both 
positive and negative directions, depending upon which side of the regula­
tion a particular firm is situated. At the present time there are 85 different 
regulations that may affect small business direcdy, and these 85 do not include 
regulations that may have an ancillary effect on the profitability of a small 
firm. While all firms experience varying degrees of difficulty in complying 
with environmental regulations, small firms have their own special set of 
problems in dealing with environmental compliance. Typically, small firms 
do not have legal or engineering staffs to assist them, nor do they have the 
financial resources available to larger firms. Often a small firm’s cost per unit 
of production to comply with environmental regulations is much larger than
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those of their large competitors (Environmental Protection Agency, 1988). 
In addition, the management structure of the small firm does not typically 
include an environmental officer with the accompanying staff to respond to 
environmental regulations. The implication of this lack of an environmental 
response team implies a diversion of a small firm ’s limited resources to 
formulating a cost effective response to the rapidly changing landscape of 
environmental regulations.
O f this myriad of federal environmental regulations, those policies ad­
dressing the regulation of hazardous wastes are rapidly evolving into one of 
the major issues affecting the role of the small business sector as the mzgor 
generator of new jobs in the U.S. The cornerstone of hazardous waste 
regulation, in terms of both actual and potential impacts, is the Comprehen­
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, commonly 
referred to as Superfund, passed by Congress in 1980. In 1986 Congress 
extended and strengthened Superftind through the Superfund Amendments 
and Reauthorization Act. Together, Superfund and its amendments have led 
to very significant regulatory programs that are absorbing increasing re­
sources on the part of both the Environmental Protection ^ e n c y  (EPA) and, 
more importandy, regulatees everywhere (Portney, 1992). The actual and 
potential magnitude of Superfund related costs is staggering. According to a 
recent EPA study (EPA, 1990) the total annual cost of compliance incurred 
by all regulated parties as a result of the entire set of federal environmental 
regulations amounted to $97 billion. O f this total, EPA estimates that $12 
billion, or 12 percent, are costs direcdy attributable to Superfund. Over the 
next decade these costs are expected to grow, with total annual compliance 
costs estimated to be between $150 and $165 billion by the year 2000, and 
Superfund’s share of these costs estimated at $32 billion. Thus, by the end of 
this decade the annual cost of complying with federal hazardous waste 
regulations will account for about 20 percent of all federally mandated 
environmental spending (Portney, 1992).
Once a hazardous waste site has been designated a Superfund site, the 
EPA names one or more potentially responsible parties (PRP). This PRP 
designation is the name given to any party which may have generated, 
transported, or disposed of waste at a Superfund site, or may have owned or 
operated a site. Superfund’s site-by-site fundraising mechanism relies on 
strict, retroactive, joint, and communal liability. This liability standard means 
that PRP’s are liable for waste disposal that took place before Superfund was 
passed (retroactive liability), and that may have been lawful at the time (strict 
liability). Liability is not limited to a PRP’s “fair share” of costs based on its 
wastes. Each PRP may be held liable for the entire cost of cleanup, regardless 
of its specific contribution to a site (joint and communal liability). Average
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remedial design and cleanup costs are in the neighborhood of $25-$30 
million per site (Porter, 1993), although some studies have estimated these 
costs to be as high as $50 million per site (Russell, 1991).
The indiscriminate liability features of Superfund provide the motivation 
for this research. Specifically, the objective of this study is to assess the impact 
of Superfund Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) status on the ability of 
smaller firms to raise capital, invest in plant and equipm ent and to continue 
creating jobs. The analysis of the impact of Superfund on small firms is 
especially im portant given the fundamental change in federal environmental 
regulation that has occurred over the past 20 years. In that time span, the 
focus of environmental regulation has shifted away from the traditional 
concentration on air and water pollution and toward the regulation of 
hazardous waste (Portney, 1992; Vig & Kraft, 1990). Thus, an assessment of 
the impacts of Superfund liability on small firms is not only im portant for 
Superfund’s direct effects on PRPs, but also provides some assessment of the 
general effects of increasing hazardous waste regulations that appear to be 
the emphasis of current environmental policy.
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n . SURVEY DESIGN AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
The instrum ent designed for the evaluation of the impact of Superfund was 
a questionnaire mailed to 5000 firms that were at some point designated a 
potentially responsible party or a third party defendant. The survey was sent 
to these PRPs in two sets of mailings. In the first stage, all 5000 PRP received 
the cover letter and the survey instrument. Approximately three weeks later 
all 5000 were again sent the identical survey with a rem inder of the earlier 
mailing. To eliminate the potential for multiple responses from a single 
respondent, each survey was identified by three distinguishing qualifiers and 
all duplicates were removed from the final analysis. A total of 520 useable 
surveys were returned, representing a response rate of 10.4 percent.
An examination of the characteristics of the respondents reveals several 
interesting findings. The firms comprise a diverse geographical distribution 
with the principal place of business representing 45 states and 430 zip codes. 
The largest concentration in any one state is six percent (33) of the total 
respondents. Eighty-eight percent of the firms in the sample employ 500 or 
less employees, which, when compared with corresponding total U.S. figures 
indicates a representative sample of firms with respect to employee size. The 
overwhelming m ^ority of these small firms are organized as corporations 
(68%) or sub-S corporations (21%), with the remaining firms being either
sole proprietorships or partnerships. Approximately half of these firms claim 
manufacturing or mining as their m ^or business activity, followed by whole­
sale or retail trade and services as the next two most common classifications 
of activity. The majority of the small firms exhibit little, if any, growth over 
the previous three year period. Thirty-two percent of the firms indicate no 
growth in their annual sales for three years, followed by 25 percent indicating 
a small annual growth (between five percent and nine percent), and nearly 
one-quarter indicate a declining sales pattern. A modest 16 percent of the 
firms claim annual sales growth patterns in excess of 10 percent. As expected, 
nearly 70 percent of the respondents are either the ow ner/operator or 
manager of the firm, and as few as 17 percent consider themselves to be the 
environmental officer.
W hat emerges from this demographic analysis is a geographically diverse 
sample of small firms from industries that are typically associated with a 
reasonable probability of at some point being named a PRP under existing 
Superfund legislation. These firms also exhibit both sales and size charac­
teristics that would render them a classification as a small U.S. firm.
For the small firms in the study, approximately two-thirds are in the 
Superfund limbo category of being named a PRP but the allocation of their 
legal liability has yet to be determined. In contrast, a qiaarter state that their 
Superfund legal liability has been paid and no longer appears on the balance 
sheet. The mzyority of the small firms appears to have had recent experiences 
with Superfund, with nearly 70 percent of the PRPs (or third party defen­
dants) being named in the last five years, and 30 percent named during the 
1983 to 1988 period. In addition, over half of the respondents owned the firm 
at the time that most of the activity for which they were named a PRP occurred.
Thus, the data represent a cross section of small firms, with potential, yet 
undeterm ined, legal liability, for being small contributors to industrial sites. 
Also, the mzyority of the businesses have recendy been designated a PRP and 
owned the firm when most of the Superfund related activity took place.
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m. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The analysis and discussion that follow cover six indicators of the economic 
impact of Superfund PRP status on smaller firms. Indicators include sales, 
employment, access to bank credit and trade credit, capital investment 
decisions, and demands on management time. The an<ilysis highlights the 
degree to which Superfund PRP status has affected these key economic 
indicators and contrasts differences in the extent of the effect of PRP status
on these variables. The analysis distinguishes between the likely short-term 
and long-term impact of PRP status. Smaller firms are defined as firms with 
500 employees or less, and 88 percent of the respondents (457) fall in this 
category. It is this set of small firms that are the focus of this study and thus, 
all firms with m ore than 500 employees are eliminated from the analysis. 
Using two-way frequency distributions, differential effects related to firm size 
are identified.
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Short-Term Impact
Sales are the driving force behind all business activity. Employment, 
capital expenditures, and debt and equity investment are driven by current 
and expected fiiture revenues. The survey requested PRPs to report sales 
growth expectations prior to being named a PRP, actual sales growth one year 
after being named a PRP, and how much of the difference, if any, could be 
attributed to being named a PRP. As indicated in Table 1, approximately half 
of the small firms expect virtually no growth in annual sales prior to being 
named a PRP. In contrast, 68 percent of the firms experience either no growth 
or a declining sales pattern after achieving the P ]^  status. Also note firom 
Table 1 that in all cases where firms expect annual sales to increase, the 
realization is less than the projection.
In a related question concerning the difference between actual and 
projected sales, 80 percent of respondents report either “no difference in 
projected and actual sales” or that being named a PRP “made no difference 
in sales.” Twenty percent attribute some of the difference to PRP status. The
Table 1 
Sales Growth
Sales Growth Rate
Expected 
(n = 356)
Actual
(n=335)
Decline >5% NA 26%
No Growth (± 5%) 52% 42%
52% 68%
Increase 5% to 9% 28% 23%
Increase 10% to 14% 14% 6%
Increase 15% to 24% 5% 3%
Increase > 25% 1% 1%
100% 100%
20 percent included 13 percent attributing less than 25 percent of the 
difference to PRP status and seven percent attributing 25 percent or more of 
the difference to PRP status.
Since 73 percent of respondents were named PRPs between 1986 and 
1993, it seems reasonable to conclude that much of the difference between 
expected and actual sales may be the result of the recession that occurred 
during that time period. In some indefinable way, the fact that the mzyority 
of PRP’s (80%) did not blame PRP status for disappointing sales lends 
credibility to the objectivity of their response to the survey. While 20 percent 
in itself is a nontrivial number, it is also worth noting that the adverse impact 
of PRP statixs on the difference between expected and actual sales growth is 
related to company size. The smaller the firm, the greater the percentage who 
consider PRP status as the reason for these less than projected sales growth 
figures.
As an additional measure of the short-term impacts of Superfund, the 
small firms in the study state the change in their total employment after being 
named a PRP at a Superfund site. One year after being named a PRP, 26 
percent of the sample employ fewer people than they did prior to being 
named a PRP. The num ber of firais cutting payrolls is consistent with the fact 
that 26 percent of the respondents reported a decline in sales (Table 1) over 
the one-year period within which they were named a PRP. Not consistent with 
the sales change data is the fact that one year after being named a PRP, 
one-third of the sample firms reported increased revenues (Table 1), but only 
13 percent added employees. Firms in the sample were quicker to reduce 
payrolls as sales declined than to increase payrolls as sales rose. Hiring 
decisions tend to be based on long-term growth expectations and the ability 
to finance growth. If management anticipates that PRP status will have a 
material adverse effect on access to the capital required to finance growth, it 
is likely that PRP status played a part in the hiring decisions of the growing 
firms in the sample. Since comparable data is not available for nonPRP small 
firms, the degree to which this fire/h ire pattern can be attributed to respon­
dents’ PRP status cannot be ascertained. Nevertheless, the pattern is consis­
tent with expected management response to the uncertainty of PRP liability.
In the aggregate, vendors are the largest providers of short-term credit 
for smaller firms (Longenecker, 1991). Therefore, any events that adversely 
affect trade credit could have a significant impact on smaller firms’ ability to 
finance growth and create jobs. It appears from the sample data that PRP 
status had litde immediate effect on the amount of trade credit provided by 
vendors. Only seven percent of respondents (27 firms) reported that PRP 
status adversely affected the amount of trade credit provided by vendors. 
While the absolute numbers are small, there is a relationship between the
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effect of PRP status on trade credit and firm size. The percentage of firms 
with 0-19 employees that indicate a reduction or total withdrawal of trade 
credit is four times as large as those firms with 100-500 employees (14% vs 
3%). The effect of PRP status on vendor credit terms (due date) is smaller 
than the effect on the am ount of trade credit, with 96 percent of the firms 
indicating no change in the net due date.
Speculation about reasons behind the limited short-term effect of PRP 
status on both the am ount and terms of trade credit include the following 
possibilities: vendors are unaware of customer’s PRP status, vendor credit is 
very short-term credit (typically 30 days), vendor credit seldom covers more 
than 30-45 day purchases, out-of-pocket exposure is limited to the variable 
costs em bedded in products shipped or services rendered (substantially less 
than invoice price), or profit margins are typically large enough to cover 
vendors’ perceptions of the incremental risks associated with customer PRP 
status. However, the m inor short-term effect may understate the long-term 
effect of PRP status on access to trade credit. For small firms, designation as 
a PRP results in a “Special Event” notice to Dun Be Bradstreet (D&B) 
subscribers and the withdrawal of a firm’s D&B  credit rating (Davies, 1993). 
A “no rating” status by D&'B says to creditors—‘You judge for yourself.” This 
D&'B “no rating” status and disclosure in DisfB credit reports of a firm ’s PRP 
liability is likely to have a more material effect on access to credit from new 
vendors, with no credit history to use zis a guide, than on relationships with 
existing vendors. It is reasonable to expect that the adverse effect of PRP status 
on access to trade credit will grow as time goes on or until a firm’s PRP liability 
is established.
Bank credit ranks second to trade credit as a source of short-term financ­
ing for small firms. Survey recipients were asked to report on the effect of 
PRP status on the am ount and the terms of credit accommodations provided 
by their bankers. Table 2 summarizes the responses concerning the effect of 
PRP status on the am ount of credit made available by their bankers. Twenty 
percent of all respondents reported that PRP status affected the amount of 
bank credit provided by their bankers. O f these 20 percent, four percent 
indicate that all credit is withdrawn and the remaining 16 percent experience 
either a reduction in, or a refusal to increase, bank credit. When these impacts 
are categorized according to firm size, it appears that as the size of the firm 
decreases, the percentage of firms who experience an adverse effect on the 
amount of bank credit increases.
It is difficult to reconcile the 80 percent for whom PRP status had no effect 
with the implications of widespread anecdotal evidence suggesting that PRP 
status typically leads to the withdrawal of all bank credit accommodations. 
However, a different picture emerges with respect to the effect of PRP status
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Table 2 
Bank Credit—Amount 
(n=355)
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Effect Percent
No effect 81%
Credit increase refused 7%
Reduced l%-24% 4%
Reduced 25%-49% 2%
Reduced 50%-99% 2%
4%
All credit withdrawn 19%
100%
on the terms of bank credit. Respondents provided information concerning 
the effect of PRP status on the terms of their bank credit accommodations. 
One hundred forty-seven firms reported that PRP status affected their bank 
credit terms, which is more than twice the num ber of firms (69) that reported 
that PRP status affected the amount of their bank credit. Note from Table 3 
that bankers typically did not respond to the increased risk of lending to PRP 
accounts by raising interest rates (the explicit cost of credit), bu t by imposing 
terms and conditions designed to reduce credit risk exposure. These terms 
and conditions are not cost free to borrowers. They represent implicit costs 
that in indirect, nonquantifiable ways impose constraints on management’s 
ability to make otherwise optimal business decisions an d /o r attract capital 
from other sources.
Table 3 
Bank Credit—^Terms 
(n=147)
Effect Percent
Increased collateral required 37%
Required a personal guarantee 41 %
Raised the interest rate 13%
Other 9%
100%
Long-Term Impact
The sales, employment, bank credit, and trade credit issues tend to reflect 
the short-term impact of PRP statiis. Given the country’s reliance on smaller 
firms for new products and new jobs (Cognetics, 1993; Hale, 1992; Light, 
1993), the longer term impact on smaller firms’ ability to raise capital, invest 
in plant and equipment, and generate new revenues and new jobs takes on 
particular significance.
To address these long-term issues respondents are asked whether any 
planned investments in plant an d /o r equipm ent are postponed or canceled 
as a result of being named a PRP. Investing in long-term assets reflects 
m anagem ent’s expectations for fixture cash flow generating revenues and the 
availability and cost of long-term debt and equity capital. Based upon re­
sponses to questions dealing with plant and equipm ent decisions (Table 4), 
it appears highly likely that the long-term impact of PRP status on the ability 
of smaller firms to raise capital and create jobs will be substantially greater 
dian the short-term impact. Specifically, 39 percent of the small firms reduced 
or delayed their investment in plant and equipm ent as a result of being named 
a PRP. This figure is twice the percentage of respondents that attributed the 
difference between expected and actual sales one year after being a PRP to 
their PRP status. In addition, the impact of PRP status on plant and equip­
m ent decisions is related to company size. Approximately half of the firms 
with 0-19 employees postponed or canceled plant and equipm ent expendi­
tures as a result of their PRP status, as opposed to a quarter of the firms with 
100-500 employees. The size and uncertainty of PRP liability can be expected
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Table 4
Investment in Plant and/or Eqiupment 
(n = 371)
Effect Percent
No change in planned investment 61%
Moderate (5%-39%) reduction in 21%
planned investment
M^or (40%-89%) reduction in 11%
planned investment
All (90%-100%) investment 7%
postponed or delayed
Total investment reduction 39%
100%
Table 5
Required Returns from Investment Projects 
(n=337)
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Effect Percent
No impact 74%
Increased required rate 5%-9% 11%
Increased required rate 10%-14% 5%
Increased required rate 15%-24% 4%
Increased required rate 25%-49% 2%
Increased required rate 50% or more 4%
Total increase 26%
100%
to have an increasingly adverse impact on smaller firm PRPs as time goes on. 
In view of the fact that respondents appear to have replied honestly to the 
survey, being named a PRP could have a material long-term adverse effect on 
the most productive job  generating segment of the economy.
Required rates of return on capital investments (hurdle rates) reflect 
management’s perceptions of the availability and the explicit cost of long­
term debt and equity capital. Respondents are asked about the effect of 
potential Superfund liability on the expected rates of return required from 
new investment projects (Table 5). Fully one quarter of all the small firms 
indicate an increase in their required rate of return, and of these, 11 percent 
state that their Superfund liability results in an increase of between five and 
nine percent in the rate. The impact of PRP status on hurdle rates is also 
related to firm size, with twice as many smaller firms (0-19 employees) 
experiencing an increase in the hurdle rate than the corresponding larger 
firms (100-500 employees).
It appears that respondents deal with the impact of PRP status on invest­
m ent decisions partly through increases in required rates of return and partly 
through more subjective decision criteria. In any event, the effects of the 
burden of PRP status will manifest themselves over an extended period of 
time as the consequences of delayed capital investment impact the competi­
tive position of smaller firm PRPs. With 40 percent of respondents delaying 
capital spending, the long-term effects are likely to exceed the short-term 
effects by a substantial margin.
Limitations on the breadth and depth of management staff are among 
the most severe resource constraints confronting smaller firms. One senior 
management day per m onth is a nontrivial diversion of this resource. Table
Table 6
Management Time Devoted to Superfund Issues 
(n = 449)
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Senior Management Time Percent
None 14%
1% to 5% 52%
6% to 10% 16%
11% to 15% 8%
16% to 20% 3%
20% or more 7%
100%
6 summarizes the issue of the diversion of senior management time. During 
the last five years, 52 percent of respondents devoted from one to five percent 
of senior m anagem ent time to Superfund related issues. Another 35 percent 
spent more than five percent of senior management time on Superfund 
issues. By any definition, PRP status had a “material” impact on senior 
management time for 87 percent of respondents. This question attracted a 
98 percent response rate, the highest response rate of all survey questions. 
Senior m anagem ent is responsible for long-term strategic decisions. As is true 
of delayed capital expenditures, the adverse consequences of management 
attention diverted to PRP issues will be felt over an extended period of time.
IV. EVALUATING THE SURVEY BIAS
Inherent in any mail survey is the potential for nonresponse bias and a bias 
in the quality of the responses from those firms who returned the survey. The 
quality bias is especially important to assess when the survey instrum ent 
addresses a volatile issue such as Superfund liability. As a means of assessing 
the degree and impact of this inherent bias several strategies are adopted. To 
address the qualitj^ of the data, the demographics of the responding firms are 
compared to corresponding national averages. To ascertain the quality of the 
responses, a subjective evaluation of the appropriateness of the responses is 
undertaken. To estimate the degree of nonresponse bias, a postcard is sent 
to the nonrespondents, soliciting the reasons why the firm did not respond 
to the survey.
Table 7 
Firm Size
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Number of 
Employees
Responding Firms National Average
Percent Cumulative Percent Percent Cumulative Percent
0-19 33% 33% 83% 83%
20-99 34% 67% 10% 93%
100-499 21% 88% 3% 96%
500 or larger 12% 100% 4% 100%
* Source: Birch (1987).
Three demographic characteristics of the respondents are analyzed: size, 
location, and sales patterns. Table 7 compares the size of the 520 responding 
firms, as measured by the num ber of employees, with the corresponding 
national levels.
As indicated in Table 7, the small firms in the sample (those firms with 
less than 500 employees) compare favorably with corresponding total U.S. 
figures, indicating a representative sample of firms with respect to employee 
size. Note from Table 7 that the sample underestimates the num ber of firms 
with less than 20 employees, and overestimates those small firms in the 20-499 
category. These discrepancies may be due to the Superfund liability system, 
but in the absence of reliable national data on the size of PRPs, this conjecture 
cannot be ascertained. However, in the aggregate, the sample appears to 
successfully capture the small versus large firm dichotomy that exists in the 
U.S.. An analysis of the geographical distribution of the sample indicates that 
the responding firm’s principal place of bixsiness represents 45 states and 430 
zip codes. The largest concentration of respondents in any one state is six 
percent of the sample. Thus, it appears that the sample represents a geo­
graphically diverse set of firms with litde or no regional bias. An analysis of 
the annual sales growth patterns of the responding firms identifies a sample 
of small firms that are congruent with national profiles. The m ^ority (84%) 
of the small firms in the sample exhibit litde, if any, growth in sales. These 
“life-style” ventures, defined as family owned firms driven by life-style motives 
of the owner, typically account for 90 percent of all start-up ventures in the 
U.S.. Seven percent of the sample firms indicate an annual sales growth in 
excess of 15 percent. These entrepreneurial firms, commonly defined as firms 
with annual growth of 15 percent or more, account for the mzyority of the 
job  growth in the U.S. and typically represent between five and 10 percent of 
the total population of small firms (Cognetics, 1993). These annual sales
growth patterns of the respondents accurately represent those of the U.S. 
small firm population and thus, there appears to be no bias in the sample 
with respect to sales characteristics. In summary, an analysis of the demo­
graphic characteristics (size, location, and annual sales growth) of the re­
sponding firms indicates that the sample appears to be representative of the 
U.S. population of small firms, at least according to the three dimensions 
analyzed.
As a means of assessing the quality or olgectivity of the survey responses, 
an analysis of aggregate responses is undertaken. The hypothesis operating 
in this analysis is that, in dealing with a volatile issue such as Superfund 
liability, the respondents may exhibit a tendency to attribute a m ^ority of the 
difficulties in operating a small firm to the PRP status of the firm. Thus, in a 
sample where Superfund liability is the dom inant reason for an unfavorable 
bottom line, the accuracy of the responses in measuring the true impact of 
Superfund liability is suspect. As stated earlier, 80 percent of the respondents 
indicate that PRP status has no effect on their respective sales growth patterns. 
Considering the fact that the mjyority of the respondents indicate that their 
actual sales growth after being named a PRP is less than the expected sales 
growth prior to being named a PRP, only enhances the quality of the 
responses. Similar response patterns exist with respect to other dimensions. 
Eighty-one percent of the respondents state that Superfund liability has no 
effect on the am ount of bank credit provided by their bankers and over ninety 
percent attribute no effect of PRP status to both the amount and terms of 
their trade credit. To further assess the accuracy of the survey, the respon­
dents are segmented into those exhibiting little or no growth in annual sales 
and those firms with annual growth in excess of five percent. Comparing the 
responses of these two groups indicates that in most cases the nongrowth 
firms are more likely to state that PRP status has no effect on sales growth, 
bank and trade credit, than the corresponding growth firms. Thus, it appears 
that the survey respondents exhibit litde or no tendency to attribute certain 
operating difficulties to Superfund liability. That is, in facets of the business 
where Superfund liability does not effect operations, respondents are forth­
right in stating this conclusion. Likewise, it is assumed that this established 
credibility in the responses can also be extended to those situations where 
PRP status can be attributed to some of the difficulties that the firm is 
experiencing.
In an attem pt to elucidate the nature of the nonresponse bias, a postcard 
was sent to all of the 4480 nonrespondents, sohciting information as to why 
the firm did not respond to the survey. Five hundred and seven postcards 
were returned, representing an 11 percent response rate. The respondents 
were given several alternative reasons from which to choose for not complet­
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ing the survey, in addition to questions concerning the effect of Superfund 
on their business and the num ber of employees. Small firms (those employing 
less than 500 people) represent 77 percent of the respondents, with the 
rem aining 23 percent representing large firms. Recall that in the original 
survey 12 percent of the sample consisted of large firms. Thus, the nonre­
spondents represent a larger portion of the large firms than in both the 
original survey and in the U.S. population. Since these large firms are not the 
focus of the current research, it is encouraging to note that it appears that 
firms with 500 or more employees constitute a larger portion of the nonre­
spondent population than would normally be expected.
For those small firms who returned the postcard, the mostfirequent reason 
cited (35 percent of the respondents) for not responding is that the individual 
did not recall having seen the original Superfund survey. In the context of 
the present study, it is conceivable that only 65 percent of the surveys reached 
the intended party. While the reasons for this result cannot be ascertained 
with certainty, one plausible explanation lies in the situation that all Super- 
fund related correspondence is, in many instances, routed directly to the 
representing law firm, and as such, the survey would not have reached the 
intended target. Even allowing for limited recall among the recipients, it is 
conceivable that the true response rate for the survey is somewhat higher than 
previously stated, since it appears that the num ber of surveys mailed may 
overstate the num ber of potential respondents. The next largest group of 
nonrespondents (25%) state that because the effects of Superfiind on their 
business are too hard to quantify, they chose not to complete the survey. While 
this response does not give an indication of the magnitude of the potential 
effect of Superfund liability, it does, by inference, indicate that there are 
certain nonquantifiable effects. Considering the two largest response catego­
ries, nearly 60 percent of the respondents indicate that they did not see die 
survey or the effects of Superfund as too hard to quantify. Taken collectively, 
these two responses, in part, tend to mitigate any serious consequences of the 
nonresponse bias.
The rem ainder of the questions as to why the firm did not respond to the 
survey are considered pertinent by less than 20 percent of the respondents. 
The reasons cover such factors as: surveys take too much time (21 percent of 
the respondents), a concern about the confidentiality of their response 
(15%), no knowledge of Superfund (14%), and a request by legal counsel to 
not respond (10%).
While an analysis of the reasons for nonresponse does not indicate that 
the impact of Superfund liability on small business is any larger than stated, 
the responses most certainly lend support to the conclusion that the impact 
is not overstated. Also, the above results tend to discredit the argim ient that
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those firms that responded to the original survey disproportionally represent 
only those firms that were affected by Superfund and that the vast majority 
of nonrespondents are unaffected by Superfund. In essence, the postcard 
responses indicate that quite the contrary may be true—that the effects of 
Superfund on small business are at least, but possibly larger than, the impacts 
estimated in this study. In further support of ± is conclusion, firms were asked 
if Superfund has had a significant impact on their business. Nearly half of the 
small firms (46%) answered a resounding yes. While the magnitude of the 
effects on the nonrespondents cannot be quantified from the postcard, 
support has been provided for the existence of significant impacts and as 
such, the effects of nonresponse bias appears to be mitigated.
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V. CONCLUSION
Results of the research do not support prevailing anecdotal evidence suggest­
ing that PRP status has an immediate and devastating impact on smaller firms. 
However, comparison of empirical research with anecdotal evidence is largely 
an irrelevant exercise. The more appropriate questions involve the effect of 
Superfund liability on the long-term power of smaller firms to continue their 
role as the job  generating engine in our economy.
Survey data suggest that PRP status has a measurable, but limited, short­
term effect on sales. The short-term effect on trade credit is inconsequential. 
However, the withdrawal of D&"B credit ratings from small finn PRPs will 
certainly limit access to future trade credit. The immediate effect of PRP status 
on the am ount of bank credit available to small firms is also limited. Banks 
appear to have responded to borrowers’ PRP status by imposing risk reducing 
terms and conditions rather than by curtailing credit or raising interest rates. 
The survey did not directly address PRPs’ access to future bank accommoda­
tions. However, it seems reasonable to expect that once terms and conditions 
have been imposed to protect existing credit relationships, access to future 
bank credit will be sharply curtailed, especially long-term plant and equip­
m ent credit required to finance growth.
The most significant and disturbing implications of the research lead to 
conclusions about the long-term impact of PRP status. The uncertain and 
potentially ruinous costs of Superfund liability concentrate management’s 
attention and company resources on short-term survival at the expense of 
long-term growth. This is a particularly troubling consequence in view of the 
dom inant role smaller firms play in generating new jobs and the fact that the 
smaller the firm the more severe the impact of PRP status.
Senior m anagem ent is responsible for determining a firm ’s long-term 
m arket strategy and for attracting and managing the resources required to 
attain long-term olgectives. Over half of the PRP respondents devote up to 
one day per m onth of senior management time to Superfund issues. Another 
35 percent devote more than one day per m onth to Superfund issues. The 
effect of PRP status on the use of senior management time is impossible to 
measure. However, it can be said with certainty that the effect of PRP status 
on a firm ’s long-term competitive position will not be positive. Two indicators 
tend to confirm this conclusion. The first indicator is the pattern of respon­
dents’ hiring decisions after being named a PRP. Firms with declining 
revenues were quick to cut payrolls while firms with growing revenues were 
slow to add to payrolls. Both behavior patterns suggest a greater concern for 
short-term survival than for long-term growth. A second measure of the 
impact of PRP status on long-term performance can be found in its effect on 
plant and equipm ent investment decisions. Forty percent of small firm PRPs 
reported that their plant and equipm ent expenditures were reduced or 
postponed as a result of PRP status. This outcome is not surprising. It is fiirther 
evidence that the size and uncertainty surrounding PRP liability concentrates 
m anagement’s attention on short-term survival rather than long-term growth. 
Creditors and equity investors will likewise be more concerned about survival 
than growth. Unless and until final PRP liability is established, smaller firms 
will be obliged to conserve scarce resources to ensure survival, thereby 
foregoing the commitments that lead to long-term growth.
What can be done to minimize the impact of Superfund PRP status on 
smaller firms? Under the current liability system, determ ining final PRP 
liability is an extended and expensive process. By some estimates, as much as 
70 cents of every dollar of Superfund related expenditures is consumed by 
legal and consulting fees. Smaller firm PRPs have identified the present 
liability system as the dom inant Superfund problem. From the point of view 
of smaller firms, equitable and expeditious determination of final Superfimd 
liability should be the primary goal of modifications to the implementation 
of Superfimd.
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